Efficiency and Ethically Responsible Management

One common justification for the pursuit of profit by business firms within a market economy is that profit is not an end in itself but a means to more efficiently produce and allocate resources. Profit, in short, is a mechanism that serves the market’s purpose of producing Pareto superior outcomes for society. This discussion examines whether such a justification, if correct, requires business managers to remain attentive to how their firm’s operation impacts the market’s purpose. In particular, it is argued that the value of efficiency, despite views to the contrary, cannot be fully separated from the planning and intentions of business managers as long as those managers direct their firms in an ethically responsible fashion. This position is inspired by, and serves as a supportive clarification of Joseph Heath’s so-called “market failures approach” to business ethics.     

Can countries rely on foreign saving for investment and economic development?

Contrary to widespread presumption, a surprisingly large number of countries have been able to finance a significant fraction of their investment for extended periods using foreign finance. While many of these episodes are in countries where official finance is important, we also identify episodes where a substantial fraction of domestic investment is financed by private capital inflows. Although there is evidence of a positive growth effect of such inflows in the short run, that positive impact dissipates after 5 years and turns negative over longer horizons. Many such episodes end abruptly, with compression of the current account and sharp slowdowns in investment and growth. Summing over the inflow (current account deficit) episode and its aftermath, we find that growth is slower than when countries rely on domestic savings. The implication is that financing growth and investment out of foreign savings, while not impossible, is risky and too often counterproductive.     

Fixed-Term Contracts and Labor Market Duality in France

The French labor market is segmented between permanent and temporary workers. The second category has difficulty in getting an open-ended contract. This paper aims at depicting workers on short-term contracts and shows the consequences on their professional career are negative and significant. A large part of the wage gap between permanent and temporary workers remains unexplained by observable characteristics. They receive less on-the-job training and their likelihood of obtaining a stable job is lower than 30% after 1 year and a half. They have also a higher probability of being the adjustment variable in case of an economic negative shock. These different findings show the importance of using public policies to encourage transitions from fixed-term to permanent employment and reducing labor-market duality.     

Der deutsche Konjunkturzyklus: Vermessung und Zusammenhang mit Investitionen

On average, the German business cycle is four to five years long. The cycle is quite pronounced and explains about 27 % of the variation in year on year GDP growth. For fluctuations with a duration of more than two years, there is a significant unidirectional Granger causality running from GDP growth to investment. A closer look reveals two things: first of all, that the Granger causality runs from GDP to investment in equipment and machinery, not investment in construction, and second, that it is lagged foreign demand (exports) rather than domestic demand that has predictive power for investment.     

Corruption and Its Effects on FDI: Analysing the Interaction Between the Corruption Levels of the Home and Host Countries and Its Effects at the Decision-Making Level

This study furthers our understanding of how corruption affects the decision-making process of allocating foreign direct investment. Drawing on the responses of 28 managers in charge of establishing operations in a highly corrupt host country, we argue that those firms based in home countries with low levels of corruption are more proactive in preparing to face corruption abroad than those based in countries with high corruption levels. This means that firms from less corrupt home countries have strategies in place to deal with high corruption abroad. This finding is based on the fact that these firms have stronger pressures to not engage in corruption from their home stakeholders. Also, these firms might not have the experience of dealing with corruption at home, which hinders their potential to deal with corruption abroad. On the other hand, those firms based in highly corrupt home countries do not have clear strategies to deal with corruption abroad. This assertion is based on the fact that these firms might have familiarity in dealing with corruption and thus, might not see it as an obstacle to operating abroad.     

Optimal strategy for a fund manager with option compensation

I consider the problem of portfolio optimization for a manager whose compensation is given by the sum of a constant and a variable term. The constant term is a fixed percentage of the managed funds that is payed to the manager independently of his performance. The variable term is a premium that is proportional to the profit earned by the manager over a benchmark at a certain evaluation date. I find the optimal strategy and the optimal portfolio value in the Black–Scholes setting when the benchmark is a linear combination of the risky asset and the money market account.